SUMMARY
Global Restructuring and West African Migration to New York City
The increased migration of West Africans to North America devolves directly from global restructuring. As a complex of economic, political, geographic, and sociocultural phenomena, global restructuring has spurred the growth of multinational corporations, imploded notions of space and time, triggered outplacement of manufacturing from the First to the Third World, prompted the outsourcing of industrial parts and the downsizing of corporate payrolls, stimulated the emergence of globalized financial markets, brought on the feminization of the workforce in rapidly proliferating export processing zones, eroded large sectors of the American middle classes, and has induced the exponential growth of informal economies (Coombe and Stoller 1994: 251; see also Harvey 1989; Mollenkopf 1991; Sassen 1991) . 6 This complex of relations, however, has led less to the global integration of human and economic resources than to the polarization of rich and poor (Mittleman 1996; Sassen 1991 Sassen ,1996 . This polarization is quite evident in sub-Saharan Africa, a region of the world in which "the number of poor will rise by 85 million to 265 million by the year 2000" (Mittleman 1996) . Economic problems in West Africa, for example, have recently been exacerbated by the World Bank's program of insisting that credit-hungry West African governments live within their means no matter the volatility of international currency markets (Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993) . One result of these policies was the devaluation of the West African franc, which in one day lowered the Francophone West African standard of living by 50 percent, affecting the lives of millions of people, including traders who liquidated their inventories in West Africa and headed to New York City. For instance, one of the Nigerien traders on 125th Street arrived in February 1994 , two weeks after the World Bank orchestrated the devaluation of the West African franc by 50 percent. The devaluation, he said, ruined his business in Niger. With 12 children to feed, he took action by liquidating his inventory in Niger, buying a round-trip ticket between Niamey and New York City, and obtaining an American tourist visa. On arriving in New York City, he sold the return portion of his ticket and used the money to buy new inventory. After several days in New York, he was in business on 125th Street.
New York City, which most arriving West African traders consider a garden of economic opportunity, is of course no stranger to social and economic polarization. Manufacturing in New York, once a center of the Fordist economy, has declined substantially during the past 25 years, resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of stable factory jobs (Sassen 1991) . Financial service industries, the key component of the post-Fordist economy, have replaced the manufacturing sector, attracting to New York a managerial elite in advertising, finance, real estate, and information technology. The elite core of the service industry requires a legion of mostly female clerical workers, most of whom work for low wages, little employment security, and limited health insurance (Sassen 1991 (Sassen ,1994 . The forces that made New York what Saskia Sassen has called a global city have also provoked massive economic and spatial dislocation, creating what John Mollenkopf labels a "dual city" (Mollenkopf 1991) .
The duality is between a comparatively cohesive "core" group of professionals who are "hooked up" to the global corporate economy and an ethnically and culturally diverse "periphery" that is increasingly unable to organize politically in order to influence the "core" upon which its limited forms of security depend. [Coombe and Stoller 1994:252] The expansion of the gulf between rich and poor in New York City created space for the rapid growth of the informal economy. As Portes, Castells, and Benton (1989) suggest, the worldwide growth of informal entrepreneurial activities, which are unregulated, devolved from global restructuring.
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The term informal sector has come to replace more pejorative terms like the black market and the underground economy, for what makes an activity informal is not its substance, the validity of the goods or services produced, the character of the labor force, or the site of production, but the fact that "it is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated" (Castells and Portes 1989:12) . The parent who purchases day care service without filling out social security forms, the unlicensed gypsy cab driver who serves poor neighborhoods, the craftsperson building furniture in an area not zoned for manufacturing activity, the immigrant woman reading pap smears or sewing teddy bears in a poorly lit suburban garage, and the unlicensed African street vendor are all participating in the burgeoning informal economy that characterizes a global city like New York. [Coombe and Stoller 1994.254] 8 From the perspective of West African villages, New York City appears a glittering global city full of wealth and boundless economic opportunity. Ironically, such a view remains consistent with that of the elite of the service industry that dominates the formal sector. From the perspective of people living in the Bronx, East New York, or Harlem, however, New York City is often a city filled with despair, disenfranchisement, drugs, and crime-a place dominated by the informal sector.
West African Traders in Harlem
Many of the West Africans attracted by the global lights of New York City expected to earn decent wages in the formal sector. They did not come to New York, according to many of them, to settle, but to make as much money as possible and then return home-a very transnational conceit. After arriving, they soon found out that their lack of English, limited technological skills, and murky immigration status made working in the regelated economy almost impossible. Facing this brutal reality, they entered the informal economy, many of them becoming street vendors.
Prior to 1990, the primary West African practitioners of informal street trading were Senegalese men vending from tables set up along midtown Manhattan sidewalks. Given the regulatory difficulties of obtaining a vending license from New York City, the majority of the Senegalese conducted unlicensed operations (Coombe and Stoller 1994; Ebin and Lake 1992; Stoller 1996) . By 1985, scores of Senegalese had set up tables in front of some of Manhattan's most expensive retail space along Fifth Avenue. Such a cluttered Third World place in a First World space soon proved intolerable to the Fifth Avenue Merchants Association. Headed by Donald Trump, the Association urged City Hall to crack down on the unlicensed vendors.
Following the cleanup, Senegalese vendors relocated to less precious spaces midtown: Lexington Avenue, 42nd Street near Grand Central Station, and 34th Street near Times Square, to name several locations. They worked in teams to protect themselves from the authorities and petty criminals. One person would sell goods at a table. His compatriot partners would post themselves on corners as lookouts. Another compatriot would serve as the bank, holding money safely away from the trade. In this way, midtown side streets became Senegalese turf.
As more Senegalese arrived in New York City, the vending territory expanded north to 86th Street on the east side and south to 14th Street in Greenwich Village and Canal Street in lower Manhattan. In some areas the Senegalese replaced vending tables with attache* cases filled with "Rolex" and other "high-end" watches.
By 1990 the Senegalese had a lock-hold on informal vending space in most of Manhattan. Backed by the considerable financial power of the Mourids, a Sufi brotherhood in Senegal to which many of the Senegalese vendors belong, the Senegalese soon became the aristocracy of West African merchants in New York City (Coombe and Stoller 1994 ; Ebin and Lake 1992; Stoller 1996) . When merchants from Mali and Niger immigrated to New York City in 1989 and 1990, the Senegalese had already saturated the lucrative midtown markets, which compelled the Malians and Nigeriens to set up their tables along 125th Street, the major commercial thoroughfare in Harlem.
Although African Americans have a long history of vending on the streets of Harlem (Bluestone 1991 Undocumented traders spend much of their time trying to obtain what they call "papers." They hire immigration brokers to fill out forms and immigration lawyers to represent them at the INS. As one undocumented trader from Niger put it, "Life in New York is full of uncertainties." Like most of his compatriots, he does not plan to settle in the United States; he will remain until "the time is right" to return.
And so this community of documented and undocumented West African traders is profoundly transnational. Only a small percentage of traders have married American women and have started families. Many of these men, who are among the most successful traders, hope to raise their children in both New York City and West Africa. The vast majority of traders, however, remains single and has no plans to marry American women. As they put it almost invariably, they have come to exploit an economic situation and will return to West Africa as soon as they possibly can. In other words, they will leave New York when they have made enough money to return home with dignity and start a new enterprise.
Few traders aspire to American citizenship, and they feel little social connection to the communities in which they live. As a result, they contribute little socially to community life in places like Harlem, where I have often heard shoppers grumbling about how African traders exploit them. The ongoing expression of this attitude has reinforced a low-grade fever of mutual resentment between West African traders and African American shoppers. The sociocultural, legal, and political tensions of living in New York City have also solidified the negative impressions that many West Africans hold of American society. Many of them see the city as a violent, insensitive, time-constrained place where morally depleted people (non-Muslims) do not have enough time to visit one another. In these circumstances, West African traders create informal associations for purposes of credit or mutual assistance. Many of them are also part of larger transnational economic networks, the cores of which are based in Senegal, Cote d'lvoire, Mali, and Niger. It is to such networks that many of them owe their economic and/or social allegiance. The most important of these are the Mourids, the Senegalese-based Sufi brotherhood, who are also well organized in New York City. Many Senegalese street vendors are members of the brotherhood and owe their allegiance to their sheik in Touba City, Senegal. The Mound order was founded by Amadou Bamba in 1898 and is a major political force in contemporary Senegal. Bamba believed that the way to salvation was through hard work and profit.
There are, I believe, less-organized purely economic networks among nonSenegalese traders. I met one older Nigerien man based in Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire who told me how he had arranged to get visas for "the children"-his economic clients-so that they could travel to and work in New York City. He regularly flies to New York from Abidjan to check in on "the children." These realities mean that the dynamic community of West African traders in New York City has little social stability and few formal institutions.
Doing Fieldwork: From Niger to Transnational New York
Prior to beginning ethnographic fieldwork in New York City in 1992, my research experience had been in the rural western region of the Republic of Niger, where I conducted fieldwork in ethnically diverse villages. Despite the multiethnicity of these villages, I focused my attention on the majority population, the Songhay people, who had been in residence for almost 1,000 years. In addition to their glorious history of empire and conquest, the Songhay regularly practiced such profoundly interesting religious rituals as spirit possession and sorcery, which appealed to my sensibilities. Since the solitary ethnographer cannot describe everything in the field, I concentrated on Songhay religious practices. This decision meant that I backgrounded many significant topics: the political economy of multiethnic diversity in western Niger, the social importance of Islam, and the impact of modernization on cultural identity and production.
Between 1977 and 1990 I periodically lived in such rural villages as Tillaberi, Mehanna, and Wanzerbe, where I listened to the stories of sorcerers, spirit possession priests, and spirit mediums. As I returned to the field year after year, these priests and mediums asked me to participate in Songhay religious ceremonies. Through this participation I came to understand that in Niger at least it was best to conduct research in a slow-paced and open-ended manner. In this way, the longer the period of research, the more entangled one became in a network of social relationships, all of which bore personal as well as professional consequences.
During the time of my fieldwork in Niger I also felt economically, socially, and politically autonomous. The government of Niger officially sanctioned my presence; I carried a research authorization letter signed by the President of the Republic. This autonomy also resulted from Niger's colonial legacy. Although Niger became independent 17 years before I began my research, the cultural reality of colonialism seemed very much intact (see N. Thomas 1994) . Peasants used categories of race to resent and revere the French, to admire modern technology, and to denigrate African backwardness.
My colonial contoured whiteness in spaces of colonized blackness made aspects of my research frustrating, for most people categorized me as a rich white tourist seeking adventure in Africa. Accordingly, typical interactions took on mercenary dimensions. When people heard me speak the Songhay language, however, they smiled and wondered where I had learned it. Perhaps their attitude toward my whiteness softened a bit, but it did not change, as I was to learn later on. In only a handful of relationships, in fact, did Songhay friends and I cross the racially contoured divide erected by Nigerien colonial culture.
The racial distance between me and Songhay people had other repercussions in the field. Racial and cultural difference not only made me putatively untrustworthy, but also defined me as someone who had to be accommodated. Many of the people who listened to my endless questions probably felt that they had no choice but to answer-no matter how much charm I attempted to conjure. Several spirit possession priests did not like the fact that I attended ceremonies and that I had been given a minor position in the Tillaberi spirit possession troupe. Yet between 1977 and 1990 they did little to block my research. I had, after all, the government's authorization and the backing of the region's most senior spirit possession priests and sorcerers, who for their own reasons thought highly of my research. As for the dissenters, they probably concluded that I was too close to power to be ignored and too far away from their social experience to be trusted. Such a sociological context made me morally but not politically accountable.
The cultural and political realities of working among West African street vendors in Harlem changed the epistemological and existential contours of my being in the field. Soon after my initial confrontation with street traders in Harlem in 1992,1 realized that I would be able to grasp little of the traders' ethnographic present if I did not understand the global forces that had compelled them to leave West Africa, as well as the political and economic context in which they now found themselves. I no longer had the luxury of focusing on one narrowlydefined cultural element, but I had to embrace sociocultural complexity. This shift meant that I needed to be more thoroughly grounded in urban and immigration studies-economics, geography, sociology, and political science, as well as urban anthropology.
Working on 125th Street in Harlem also meant that I had to learn how to do North American street ethnography among a mix of people, many of whom were in violation of city regulations, trademark and copyright statutes, and immigration laws (see Bourgois 1995) . It is not enough, however, to be committed to longitudinal studies. The hybridity of transnational spaces demands not simply multidisciplinary approaches to ethnography, but multidisciplinary teams of researchers. The New York project not only considers the migration of West African traders to a global city, but also seeks to demonstrate how global restructuring, social hybridity, and local politics affect the legal consciousness and the everyday life of law in the lives of the traders. Accordingly, the study is being coinvestigated by an anthropologist specializing in West Africa and a legal scholar specializing in intellectual property law and cultural studies. Ideally, the study would also include an urban geographer, an economist, and a political scientist.
In these times of constricted research funding, is it possible to construct multidisciplinary teams to conduct longitudinal studies of transnational spaces? I think it is. And yet there is more to the puzzle of globalizing method than a list of dos and don'ts. The key to doing research in complex transnational spaces, I think, devolves less from methods, multidisciplinary teams, or theoretical frameworks-although these are, of course, important-than from the suppleness of imagination. Transnational migrants are exceedingly creative in finding regulatory loopholes, resolving daunting financial problems, or more globally, making their way through tough transnational spaces that require imaginative and decisive solutions to ongoing economic, political, social, and legal problems. If we can appropriate some of that epistemological suppleness, we will understand
